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BONJOUR, EXTERNALISM AND THE REGRESS PROBLEM*
ABSTRACT. In this paper I assess the two central ingredients of Laurence
BonJour’s position on empirical knowledge that have survived the transition from
his earlier coherentist views to his current endorsement of the doctrine of the given:
his construal of the problem of the epistemic regress and his rejection of an inter-
nalist solution to the problem. The bulk of the paper is devoted to a critical
assessment of BonJour’s arguments against externalism. I argue that they fail to put
real pressure on externalism, as they rely on a highly questionable conception of
epistemic rationality and responsibility. Then, more brieﬂy, I take issue with Bon-
Jour’s endorsement of the irrelevance thesis—the claim that even if externalism were
true it would not oﬀer a satisfactory solution to the epistemic regress problem. I
contend that he is not entitled to subscribe this thesis unless he is prepared to
abandon his construal of the problem.
1. INTRODUCTION
Laurence BonJour’s views on the structure of empirical knowledge
have recently undergone a notorious transformation. His writings in
the late 1970s and early 1980s provided a sophisticated defence of the
coherence theory and an incisive attack on the version of founda-
tionalism based on the doctrine of the empirically given.1 However, in
his recent work he has abandoned the former in favour of the latter.2
This change of mind hasn’t been brought about by a reassessment of
the intrinsic merits of the doctrine of the given. Rather, BonJour has
abandoned coherentism because he has come to the conclusion that
some of the objections that it faces are fatal.3 And this has lead him to
embrace the doctrine of the given because he regards it as the only
plausible alternative to coherentism.
The need to choose between coherentism and givenism is forced on
BonJour by two important aspects of his earlier position that he still
subscribes. The ﬁrst is a construal of the problem of the epistemic
regress according to which avoiding scepticism requires choosing
between the coherence theory, the doctrine of the given and an
externalist account of epistemic justiﬁcation. The second is his
conviction that the externalist solution to the problem doesn’t work.
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My goal here is to assess these two aspects of BonJour’s position.
The bulk of the paper is devoted to assessing his rejection of exter-
nalism. I shall contend that the arguments that he levels against
externalism don’t pose a serious threat to this view. Then I shall turn
more brieﬂy to considering the bearing of my discussion of exter-
nalism on the epistemic regress problem. I shall contend that, in order
to uphold his conviction that externalism doesn’t oﬀer a satisfactory
solution to this problem, BonJour would have to abandon his
cconstrual of it.
2. THE EPISTEMIC REGRESS PROBLEM
Broadly speaking, the epistemic regress problem can be traced back
to the ancient sceptics. It is the problem posed by the fact that our
attempts to adduce evidence for our beliefs are bound to generate an
inﬁnite regress or a circle, or to end with an assumption for which no
evidence is provided. These three possibilities correspond to three of
the Five Modes that Sextus Empiricus attributes to ‘‘the later scep-
tics’’ and Diogenes Laertius, in a parallel account, to ‘‘Agrippa and
his school’’.4 Nevertheless, in spite of its long history, the nature of
the problem is by no means clear, and even the claim that there is so
much as a problem is open to question. Even if we concede that our
attempts to defend our beliefs from the challenge of a persistent
sceptic could only have one of these three outcomes, we still need an
explanation of how, if at all, our epistemic situation is compromised
by this circumstance.
BonJour endorses a construal of the epistemic regress problem
from which these questions receive precise answers. I am going to
characterise this construal of the problem as an argument for the
negative epistemic conclusion that the trilemma is supposed to enjoin.
The conclusion of the argument is that we can have no knowledge,
because none of our beliefs can have the feature that confers on a true
belief the status of knowledge (even if the diﬃculties posed by Gettier
cases do not arise).5 I shall use the term warrant to refer to this
feature, making no assumptions concerning its nature.6
On the construal of the argument that BonJour endorses, this
conclusion is reached with the help of two assumptions, expressing a
twofold connection between warrant and evidence. The ﬁrst is the
claim that in order for a subject’s belief in a proposition to have
warrant, the subject has to have adequate evidence for the proposi-
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tion. I shall refer to this principle as the evidential constraint on
warrant (EC). The second is an account of what adequate evidence
consists in, according to which a subject has adequate evidence for a
proposition she believes only if she has other warranted beliefs whose
truth she regards as making the truth of the target proposition likely.7
I shall refer to this principle as the inferential account of adequate
evidence (IA).
With EC and IA in place, the trilemma can be brought to bear on
the possibility of knowledge. If p is a proposition that a subject S
believes at a time t, we can easily deﬁne the notion of an evidential
tree for p, for S at t, using the relation, deﬁned on the set of prop-
ositions that S believes at t, that a proposition / bears to a set of
propositions G when S believes at t that the truth of the elements of G
would make the truth of / likely. The problem raised by EC and IA is
that they entail that every branch of every evidential tree will have
one of the following three shapes. It will be inﬁnite, it will be circular,
i.e., it will end with a proposition that has already appeared further
down the branch, or it will end with a proposition that S believes
without warrant.
If we deﬁne a standard evidential tree as one with no branches of
any of these three shapes, we can say that EC and IA entail that there
are no standard evidential trees. This result doesn’t quite yield the
conclusion of the argument. It follows from EC and IA that warrant
requires an evidential tree in which no branch ends with an unwar-
ranted belief, and one could argue that it is not humanly possible to
believe inﬁnitely many propositions, and hence that an evidential tree
can’t have inﬁnite (non-circular) branches.8 But it is certainly possible
for an evidential tree to contain circular branches, and EC and IA by
themselves do not rule out the possibility of warrant resulting from
such a tree. Hence, to yield the intended conclusion, the argument
needs an additional assumption to the eﬀect that this is not a possi-
bility. I shall refer to this assumption as the non-circularity principle
(NC).
For a subject with ﬁnitely many beliefs, EC, IA and NC entail that
none of her beliefs has warrant. I want to suggest that this argument
provides a fairly accurate characterisation of the construal of the
epistemic regress problem endorsed by BonJour, as well as by other
contemporary epistemologists.9 I shall refer to it as the contemporary
regress argument.
Since, subject to the ﬁnitude proviso, the impossibility of warrant
is deductively entailed by EC, IA and NC, vindicating the possibility
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of warrant requires giving up one of these three premises. These three
strategies correspond to the three positions in epistemology from
which, according to BonJour, we are forced to choose. In the 1980s,
BonJour held both EC and IA, and sought to vindicate the possibility
of warrant in the face of the regress argument with his coherentist
account, which licensed the rejection of NC. According to coheren-
tism, a subject’s belief in a proposition can have warrant even if all of
the subject’s evidential trees for the proposition have circular bran-
ches. Now that the objections raised against coherentism have con-
vinced him to abandon the position, he has to accept NC. And since
he still holds EC, his only chance of vindicating warrant is to reject
the universal applicability of the inferential account of adequate
evidence, arguing that in some cases we can have adequate evidence
for a proposition we believe which doesn’t take the form of other
warranted beliefs. In these cases there is ‘‘an internally available
reason why [the belief] is likely to be true without that reason
depending on any further belief or other cognitive state that is itself in
need of justiﬁcation’’.10 As BonJour is well aware, his new position
faces very serious obstacles, but after abandoning coherentism he is
left with no alternative, given that he remains as convinced as in his
coherentist days that the evidential constraint is non-negotiable.
3. THE EXTERNALIST SOLUTION
But support for the evidential constraint is by no means unanimous.
It is a fairly direct consequence of externalist accounts of knowledge
that in some circumstances a subject’s belief that p can have warrant
even if she has no adequate evidence for p. These views were initially
developed as attempts to solve problems with which we are not
concerned here, but in 1973 David Armstrong explicitly put forward
an account of knowledge along these lines as an attempt to defend the
possibility of knowledge from the challenge of the contemporary
regress argument.
Armstrong’s solution arises from an account of knowledge for a
class of beliefs which he calls ‘simple judgments of perception’. On
this account, if a subject a believes that p (Bap), and this belief is a
true judgment of perception, then it will have the status of knowledge
if there is ‘‘a law-like connection between the state of aﬀairs Bap and
the state of aﬀairs that makes ‘p’ true such that, given Bap, it must be
the case that p’’.11
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Thus on Armstrong’s account of knowledge for simple judgments
of perception, the existence of this law-like connection is a suﬃcient
condition for warrant. But the existence of this connection wouldn’t
provide the subject with adequate evidence for her belief, since she
might not even believe that the connection exists. It follows that, on
Armstrong’s account, the evidential constraint on warrant doesn’t
apply to simple judgments of perception, since they could be war-
ranted even if the subject didn’t have adequate evidence for them. We
can now invoke this outcome to save the possibility of warrant from
the threat of the regress argument. Warrant is made possible for any
beliefs with evidential trees whose branches end with simple judg-
ments of perception that sustain the relevant law-like connections.
This strategy for resisting the conclusion of the contemporary
regress argument can be underwritten by accounts of knowledge that
diﬀer substantially from Armstrong’s proposal. All that’s required is
a suﬃcient condition for warrant that can in principle be satisﬁed by
a belief even if the subject doesn’t have adequate evidence for it. In
what follows, I’d like to focus my discussion, not on Armstrong’s
proposal, but on the account of warrant known as process reliabilism,
to which BonJour himself devotes most of his attention.12 The basic
idea of process reliabilism is that whether a belief has warrant de-
pends on the reliability of the cognitive devices which have played a
role in its formation (or in sustaining it). To have some plausibility,
an account of warrant along these lines would have to exhibit a
considerable degree of complexity. However, for our immediate
purposes, all that matters is that the account entails that if a belief has
been formed with a reliable procedure, then it has warrant, at least in
some circumstances in which the subject might not have adequate
evidence for the belief. By (process) reliabilism, I shall refer to any
account of warrant which entails a principle along these lines.
The reliability of the procedure with which a belief has been
formed wouldn’t by itself furnish the subject with adequate evidence
for the belief. A warranted belief in the reliability of the procedure
would have this eﬀect, but a belief could have been reliably formed
even if the subject doesn’t believe that this is so, let alone believe it
with warrant. Hence process reliabilism, like Armstrong’s proposal,
would license violations of the evidential constraint, thus blocking the
regress argument. Warrant would be made possible for those beliefs
that obtain it from the reliability of their formation process, and these
warranted beliefs could then end the branches of evidential trees
which confer warrant on further beliefs.
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BonJour’s assumption that his current position is the only
alternative to his previous one presupposes that the externalist
strategy for dealing with the contemporary regress argument is not
available. Needless to say, BonJour doesn’t merely assume this. In
Chapter 4 of The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, he provided one
of the most forceful attacks on externalism to date.13 My goal in the
remainder is to clarify and assess BonJour’s anti-externalist argu-
ments. My conclusions will be largely negative. I shall argue ﬁrst
that his attack on externalism is far from irresistible. Then I shall
contend, more brieﬂy, that his attitude to the externalist solution to
the regress problem is incompatible with the construal of the
problem that he endorses.
4. INTUITIONS
BonJour’s attack on reliabilism is based on a series of well-known
thought experiments involving subjects with the power of clairvoy-
ance. The central case in BonJour’s argument is that of Norman:
Norman, under certain conditions which usually obtain, is a completely reliable
clairvoyant with respect to certain kinds of subject matter. He possesses no evidence
or reasons of any kind for or against the general possibility of such a cognitive power
or for or against the thesis that he possesses it. One day Norman comes to believe
that the President is in New York City, although he has no evidence either for or
against this belief. In fact the belief is true and results from his clairvoyant power
under circumstances in which it is completely reliable. (p. 41)
BonJour clearly believes that our intuitions regarding this case
undermine reliabilism. What is much less clear is the precise route by
which he expects this conclusion to be reached.
A particularly straightforward strategy for adjudicating the con-
test between the evidential constraint and reliabilism is by appeal to
our intuitions concerning the ascription of knowledge in speciﬁc
circumstances. For this purpose, we would need to concentrate on
cases in which a belief satisﬁes the suﬃcient condition for warrant
postulated by reliabilism, but not the necessary condition for warrant
laid down by the evidential constraint, i.e., cases of reliably formed
belief for which the subject has no adequate evidence. If intuition
regarding these cases dictated that the beliefs in question have war-
rant, this could be taken as evidence against the evidential constraint
and, less directly, for reliabilism. If, on the contrary, intuition
dictated that these beliefs lack warrant, we could take this result as
JOSE´ L. ZALABARDO140
undermining reliabilism and, less directly, as supporting the eviden-
tial constraint. I shall refer to this strategy as the intuitive approach.
One way to construe BonJour’s argument against externalism is as an
application of the intuitive approach. My goal in this section is to
articulate this construal and to assess the resulting anti-externalist
argument.
One diﬃculty faced by the intuitive approach is that it is
remarkably hard to ﬁnd real cases which both parties agree to de-
scribe as satisfying the reliable-formation condition but not the evi-
dential constraint. The reliable-formation condition would be
satisﬁed by cases in which a belief was formed as a result of the
operation of a basic cognitive device that is reliable, such as properly
functioning perceptual devices, or introspection. But the problem
with these cases is that it is open to the proponent of the evidential
constraint to argue that the subject has adequate evidence for these
beliefs, typically taking the form of a belief identifying the procedure
with which the target belief has been formed and a belief in the
reliability of this procedure. Take, e.g., Alicia’s belief that a train is
approaching the platform, formed by her highly reliable visual device
for the detection of events of this kind. If the reliabilist tried to appeal
to our intuition that Alicia knows that a train is approaching the
platform as supporting her position, the advocate of the evidential
constraint could reply that it would be illegitimate to interpret the
intuition in this way. She would explain the intuition instead as
resting on a background assumption to the eﬀect that Alicia has
adequate evidence for her belief. For in normal conditions we would
expect Alicia to believe that her belief that a train is approaching the
platform was formed with the relevant visual device, and that this
device is reliable. Furthermore, we would expect these beliefs of hers
to be warranted. Clearly, if this assumption is playing a role in
generating our intuition, it cannot be counted as lending support to
reliabilism or undermining the evidential constraint.
We could of course stipulate that Alicia doesn’t have adequate
evidence for her belief, but it is questionable whether this stipulation
would be eﬀective in insulating our intuitions from the background
assumption that the stipulation is meant to suspend. It is open to the
proponent of the evidential constraint to argue that if we still have the
intuition that Alicia knows that a train is approaching the platform
after stipulating that Alicia doesn’t have adequate evidence for her
belief, the reason is that the stipulation hasn’t succeeded in neutralising
the eﬀect on our intuitions of the background assumption that she does
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have adequate evidence. Let me refer to the possibility that our stip-
ulations concerning a thought experiment might not have the intended
eﬀect on our intuitions as the problem of intuition contamination.
In sum, the attempt to use the intuitive approach to adjudicate the
contest between reliabilism and the evidential constraint can be ex-
pected to generate the following dialectic. First, the reliabilist will
claim that the method supports her position, on the grounds that we
have stable intuitions to the eﬀect that when a belief has been formed
by one of our basic cognitive devices, and the device is reliable, the
belief has warrant. But even if she concedes that we have these
intuitions, the evidentialist can object to the reliabilist’s attempt to
use them in her favour, arguing that they are to be explained instead
by reference to a background assumption to the eﬀect that in such
cases the subject typically has adequate evidence for her belief. The
reliabilist might then argue that these intuitions survive the stipula-
tion that the subject doesn’t have adequate evidence, but the evi-
dentialist could question the signiﬁcance of this fact, explaining it as a
case of intuition contamination.
The only way forward for the intuitive approach appears to be to
ﬁnd cases in which we can eﬀectively stipulate that the subject lacks
adequate evidence for her belief. If intuition favours the ascription of
warrant in these cases, the evidentialist won’t be able to appeal to
intuition contamination to rescue her position. If, on the contrary,
intuition dictates that in these cases we shouldn’t ascribe warrant, the
evidentialist could claim that her objections to the intuitions that
appear to support reliabilism have been vindicated.
BonJour’s introduction of his clairvoyance cases appears to be
motivated by these reﬂections. His goal is to avoid the unfair
advantage that intuition contamination would give to the reliabilist in
more familiar cases. ‘‘Cases involving sense-perception and intro-
spection’’, he tells us, ‘‘are […] not very suitable for an intuitive
assessment of externalism, since one central issue between externalism
and other […] views is precisely whether in such cases a further basis
for justiﬁcation beyond the externalist one is typically present’’
(pp. 37–38).14 To avoid this diﬃculty, we need to concentrate on
cases ‘‘for which it will be easier to stipulate in a way which will be
eﬀective on an intuitive level that only the externalist sort of justiﬁ-
cation is present’’ (p. 38).
Norman’s case might seem to ﬁt the bill perfectly. His belief that
the President is in New York City exhibits the features that are
required for the application of the intuitive approach. On the one
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hand, the belief has been formed by a reliable procedure – Nor-
man’s powers – thereby satisfying the suﬃcient condition for war-
rant postulated by the reliabilist.15 On the other, the evidential
constraint is not satisﬁed, as Norman doesn’t have adequate evi-
dence for his belief. BonJour considers two versions of the case.16 In
the ﬁrst version, Norman takes himself to have evidence for his
belief that the President is in New York City, since he believes it to
have been formed with his clairvoyant faculty and he believes that
this faculty is reliable. However this evidence is not adequate, as
Norman’s belief in the reliability of his clairvoyant faculty lacks
warrant. In the second version, Norman doesn’t even take himself
to have evidence for his belief, since he doesn’t believe that he has
the power of clairvoyance.
Furthermore, applying the intuitive approach to this case won’t
raise the diﬃculties that we encounter when we consider more
familiar cognitive devices such as sense perception. Reliabilists won’t
obtain an unfair advantage from intuition contamination in this case,
since we have no irresistible inclination to assume that Norman has
adequate evidence for his belief. Hence if intuition dictated that
Norman doesn’t know that the President is in New York City, the
evidentialist could claim that, once it is properly applied, the intuitive
approach adjudicates in favour of her position. I am not going to
discuss whether intuition actually dictates that Norman’s belief lacks
warrant. I am going to assume that it does,17 and argue that it is open
to the reliabilist to resist the thought that this outcome puts real
pressure on her position.
My proposal is that the reliabilist could contend that in moving
from sense perception and introspection to clairvoyance, we may
have removed one potential source of contamination – but only to
replace it with another one which distorts our intuitions in the
opposite direction. The problem is that many of us have a deep-
seated conviction that clairvoyance doesn’t exist, that its possibility is
ruled out by some central elements of our world-view, and that
evidence for this assessment is readily available. Of course, in the
Norman case we stipulate that these assumptions are false, but it is
open to the reliabilist to argue that these stipulations might not
succeed in insulating our intuitions from the assumptions that they
are meant to neutralize.
There are two particular aspects of the case where contamination
might be suspected. The ﬁrst one is the claim that Norman has real
clairvoyant powers. As some authors have suggested, many of us ﬁnd
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it very hard to imagine a world in which clairvoyance is possible. If
this is so, there is reason to suspect that our negative verdict on
Norman’s belief is informed by our inability to suspend disbelief in
the existence of clairvoyance. According to this diagnosis, the reason
why we don’t think Norman knows is not that we don’t take reliable
formation to be suﬃcient for warrant, but that we can’t bring our-
selves to assume that his belief has been formed with a reliable
mechanism.18
The second feature of the case that might raise the suspicion of
contamination is the claim that Norman doesn’t have adequate
evidence for the proposition that he doesn’t have clairvoyant power.
Notice that if he had such evidence, then reliabilism could easily
accommodate the intuition that Norman doesn’t know that the
President is in New York City. On Goldman’s version of the po-
sition, the deﬁnition of warrant incorporates a non-undermining
provision, according to which a reliably formed belief wouldn’t have
warrant if the subject had evidence against the reliability of the
procedure with which it has been formed.19 Hence, if Norman had
evidence against the proposition that he has clairvoyant powers, the
intuition that his belief doesn’t have warrant would be in line with
Goldman’s account. BonJour accepts this, and the stipulation that
Norman doesn’t have any evidence or reasons against the existence
of clairvoyance or against the hypothesis that he possesses it is
explicitly designed to block this reliabilist rejoinder. Goldman’s
original response to the case was to maintain that Norman does
have evidence against the hypothesis that he has clairvoyant powers,
and hence that his non-undermining provision can deal with the
case,20 although he has later seemed less conﬁdent in this reply.21
However, even if we concede to the evidentialist the right to stip-
ulate that Norman has no evidence against clairvoyance, we can still
question the power of this stipulation to protect our intuitions from
contamination, given that we are inclined to assume that a standard
belief system provides adequate evidence for the proposition that
clairvoyance doesn’t exist.22
In sum, the reliabilist can resist the anti-reliabilist application of
the intuitive approach based on Norman’s case with the same
tools that the evidentialist deployed to resist the pro-reliabilist
application. The anti-reliabilist signiﬁcance of our intuitions in
Norman’s case, like the pro-reliabilist signiﬁcance of our intuitions
in the case of sense perception, is tainted by the suspicion of
contamination.23
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5. BONJOUR AND THE INTUITIVE APPROACH
In Section 4 I have developed a construal of BonJour’s anti-exter-
nalist case as an application of the intuitive approach. I have argued
there that using Norman’s clairvoyance thought experiments in this
way wouldn’t result in a very powerful anti-reliabilist argument. In
this section I am going to question the attribution of this argument to
BonJour.
BonJour manifests his attitude to an anti-reliabilist application of
the intuitive approach when he is evaluating the attempt to deploy
this strategy in defence of reliabilism. He characterises the starting
point of this argument in the following terms:
The basic factual premise of the argument is that in many cases which are com-
monsensically instances of justiﬁed belief and of knowledge, there seem to be no
justifying factors present beyond those appealed to by the externalist. (p. 52)
A proponent of an anti-reliabilist application of the intuitive ap-
proach can be expected to reject this premise – to contend that in
cases (like Norman’s) in which no justifying factors are present be-
yond those appealed to by the reliabilist, intuition dictates that the
beliefs in question don’t have the status of knowledge. However,
BonJour’s assessment of this premise is completely diﬀerent:
Though the precise extent to which it holds could be disputed, in the main the initial
factual premise of this argument must simply be conceded. Any nonexternalist ac-
count of empirical knowledge that has any plausibility will impose standards for
justiﬁcation that many commonsensical cases of knowledge will fail to meet in any
full and explicit way. (pp. 52–53)
BonJour then goes on to question the strength of the support that
reliabilism would receive from this premise, arguing that an account of
warrantmight in principle be correct even if it forces us to revise someof
our intuitive ascriptions of knowledge. A defence of reliabilism that
takes these intuitions as the ﬁnal arbiter for the correctness of an ac-
count of warrant would rely on the following additional premise:
[…] that the judgments of common sense as to which of our beliefs qualify as
knowledge are sacrosanct, that any serious departure from them is enough to
demonstrate that a theory of knowledge is inadequate. (p. 53)
But this premise, BonJour tells us,
[…] seems entirely too strong. There seems in fact to be no basis for more than a
quite defeasible presumption (if indeed even that) in favor of the correctness of
common sense. (Ibid.)
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Although BonJour’s intention is to undermine a defence of reliabi-
lism along the lines of the intuitive approach, it is clear that his
position would undermine to the same extent an attempt to use this
strategy to attack reliabilism.
In light of these considerations, we have to conclude that BonJour
takes a very dim view of the attempt to defend the evidential con-
straint by applying the intuitive approach to his clairvoyance cases.
He thinks that conﬂict with our intuitive warrant ascriptions
wouldn’t seriously undermine an account of warrant, and even if it
did, the proponent of the evidential constraint wouldn’t be able to use
this circumstance to her advantage, as reliabilism provides a better
match for our intuitive warrant ascriptions than the evidential con-
straint. The argument that uses the intuitive approach to undermine
reliabilism can’t be BonJour’s.
6. EPISTEMIC RATIONALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY
This raises the question of how we should construe the reasoning in
which BonJour appeals to the clairvoyance cases to undermine
reliabilism. He tells us that his goal in presenting these cases is to
support and develop the following intuitive diﬃculty with externalism:
according to the externalist view, a person may be highly irrational and irresponsible
in accepting a belief, when judged in light of his own subjective conception of the
situation, and may still turn out to be epistemically justiﬁed […] (p. 38)
This aspect of the argument is emphasized in a later passage, where
he describes his anti-externalist argument as putting forward the
following conception of epistemic rationality: ‘‘of such rationality as
essentially dependent on the believer’s own subjective conception of
his epistemic situation’’ (pp. 49–50).
These passages suggest an anti-reliabilist case based on the con-
tention that reliabilism ascribes warrant to a belief in cases in which
the subject is epistemically irrational and irresponsible in holding it
(relative to his own subjective conception of the situation). According
to this line of thought, reliabilism would have to be rejected on the
grounds that this consequence is unacceptable. An argument against
reliabilism along these lines would invoke the following two premises:
1. Reliabilism entails that a belief can have warrant even if the subject
is epistemically irrational and irresponsible in holding it (relative to
his own subjective conception of the situation).
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2. A belief can’t have warrant if the subject is epistemically irrational
and irresponsible in holding it (relative to his own subjective con-
ception of the situation).
I want to suggest that this is the main argument that BonJour is
advancing against reliabilism, and that the role of the clairvoyance
thought experiments in his discussion is to provide support for these
premises. I shall consider each premise in turn.
Before we proceed, let me mention brieﬂy a prominent line of
reasoning that I shall not be considering here. One could object to
this argument on the grounds that the notions of responsibility and
rationality can’t be applied to belief, because these notions can only
be applied to items that are under the voluntary control of the sub-
ject, and belief doesn’t satisfy this condition: we cannot decide what
to believe. I shall not try to assess this line of reasoning here. I only
want to point out that its success is open to question, and hence that
the existence of other weaknesses in BonJour’s reasoning would not
be of merely academic interest.24 In what follows I am going to waive
this diﬃculty and assume for the sake of the argument that it makes
perfect sense to ascribe to belief rationality and responsibility, as well
as their opposites.
7. PREMISE 1
The core of BonJour’s case for Premise 1 is the thought that the
principle is instantiated by Norman’s case. On the one hand, the
reliabilist is committed to ascribing warrant to Norman’s belief that
the President is in New York City. On the other hand, Norman is
epistemically irrational and irresponsible in holding this belief (rela-
tive to his own subjective conception). As we saw in Section 4, the
ﬁrst of these claims has not gone unchallenged. Nevertheless it is
the second claim that I want to consider here. My goal is to assess the
claim that, in holding his belief about the President’s whereabouts,
Norman is epistemically irrational and irresponsible (relative to his
own subjective conception).
For this purpose we need to clarify the notion of rationality and
responsibility that ﬁgures in the claim. The ﬁrst point we need to note
is that according to BonJour, what distinguishes epistemic rationality
or responsibility from other forms of rationality or responsibility is its
relation to the cognitive goal of truth. A precise construal of this goal
raises familiar problems, but for our purposes we just need to assume
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that it is a goal that would be promoted, for any given proposition,
by believing it if it is true, and not believing it if it is false.
I propose then to think of epistemic rationality and responsibility
as instrumental, or means-ends rationality, relative to the goal of
believing a proposition if and only if it is true. On this construal of the
notion, the epistemic rationality of holding a belief will depend on the
extent to which doing so promotes the cognitive goal of truth.
Now, the instrumental rationality of an action can be assessed from
several points of view. One possibility is to assess it from an objective
perspective, in terms of the objective likelihoodof the action promoting
the relevant outcome. Alternatively, we can assess it from the point of
view of a certain conception of the relevant situation, independently of
whether this conception is correct. The assessments of instrumental
value that we would obtain from diﬀerent conceptions of the situation
can be expected to diﬀer from each other, and the assessments that
would result from an incorrect conception can be expected to diﬀer
from those that we would obtain from the objective point of view.
Thus, on this construal, BonJour is claiming that from the point of
view of Norman’s own conception of his situation, holding his belief
that the President is in New York City is of little instrumental value,
relative to the cognitive goal of truth. But the instrumental value of
holding a belief relative to the cognitive goal of truth will depend on
how likely it is that the belief is true. Hence, on my construal,
BonJour’s claim is that from the point of view of Norman’s own
conception of his situation, his belief that the President is in New
York City is unlikely to be true.
In order to assess this claim, we need to reach a more precise
understanding of the notion of ‘‘Norman’s conception of his own
epistemic situation’’. As a ﬁrst approximation, we can say that how
likely it is, from the point of view of a subject’s conception of her
situation, that an action will promote a goal, is determined by how
likely she believes it to be that the action will promote the goal. This
thought yields the following account of subjective rationality and
responsibility:
R1 From the point of view of a subject’s conception of her situ-
ation, it is rational and responsible for her to perform action A
in pursuit of goal G just in case she believes that A is likely to
promote G.25
In the particular case of epistemic rationality and responsibility, the
account would go as follows:
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ER1 From the point of view of a subject’s conception of her epi-
stemic situation, it is epistemically rational and responsible to
believe that p just in case she believes that p is likely to be
true.
Notice that it follows from this account that for a subject who be-
lieves that p, holding this belief would be epistemically irrational and
irresponsible from the point of view of her conception of her situation
only if she didn’t believe that p is likely to be true. One is entitled to
wonder whether this is a coherent possibility–whether there is a
possible cognitive state that we would want to describe by saying that
the subject believes that p but doesn’t believe that p is likely to be
true. But even if we accept this as a genuine possibility, it is hard to
see how BonJour could exploit it to defend the epistemic irrationality
and irresponsibility of Norman’s belief, since nothing in his
description of the case indicates that Norman fails to believe that it is
likely that the President is in New York City. The point is particularly
clear in the ﬁrst of the two versions of the case that BonJour con-
siders, on which I shall focus my discussion in the ﬁrst instance. In
this version, ‘‘Norman believes himself to have clairvoyant power
even though he has no justiﬁcation for such a belief’’, and this belief
‘‘contributes to his acceptance of the belief about the President’s
whereabouts’’ (pp. 41–42). Clearly, if Norman believes that he has
clairvoyant powers, he will believe that the propositions that are
sanctioned by this faculty, including the proposition that the Presi-
dent is in New York City, are very likely to be true. I think we can
conclude that on this construal of the notion of the subject’s con-
ception of her situation, there are no grounds for accusing Norman of
irrationality and irresponsibility.
Since BonJour cannot exploit to his advantage the possibility of
believing that p while failing to believe that p is likely to be true, we
can simplify matters by ignoring it. Thus in what follows I shall
assume, for the sake of simplicity, that a subject believes that p if and
only if she believes that p is likely to be true.
This would be the end of the story if the account of subjective
rationality and responsibility expressed by R1 and ER1 were correct.
But the account needs to be revised. The problem is that, as it stands,
it allows a subject to achieve rationality and responsibility by simply
refusing to face the facts. Suppose that Alex drinks one bottle of
whisky a day in order to improve his health, and he actually believes
that drinking one bottle of whisky a day is likely to have this eﬀect,
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but only because he has deliberately avoided exposure to medical
opinion about the likely eﬀects of this level of alcohol consumption.
It seems to me that in these circumstances we might not want to say
that from the point of view of Alex’s conception of the situation,
drinking one bottle of whisky a day is rational and responsible, rel-
ative to the goal of preserving his health, even though he believes that
this policy is likely to promote the relevant goal. The same point can
be made in the case of epistemic rationality. Suppose that Tracey
believes that her husband liked the present she bought for him, but
only because she hasn’t asked him, although she believes that he
would tell her the truth if she asked, but would otherwise act as if he
had liked the present, whether he did or not. One could argue that
from the point of view of Tracey’s conception of the situation it is not
rational for her to hold this belief, relative to the cognitive goal of
truth.
These examples indicate that there are circumstances in which one
can plausibly claim that the subject’s beliefs do not determine what’s
rational and responsible for her to do in pursuit of a goal, from the
point of view of her conception of her situation. I want to suggest
that these are all cases in which the subject hasn’t done her best, by
her lights, to determine the likelihood that the course of action in
question will bring about the relevant outcome. Alex may believe that
one bottle of whisky a day will keep the doctor away, but he also
believes that his doctor knows more about these things than he does,
and he hasn’t consulted her. Tracey may believe that her husband
liked the present, but she also believes that she could easily check by
asking him, and she has failed to do so. There are cognitive proce-
dures that they haven’t implemented, although they could have done
so, which they think might have aﬀected their assessment of the
likelihood that the course of action in question will bring about the
relevant goal.
We can accommodate this point by restricting the connection
between the subject’s conception of the situation and the beliefs she
holds about it to cases in which she has done her best by her lights to
determine the likelihood of the action in question promoting the
relevant goal. This move would leave us with the following weaker
principle:
R2 If a subject has done her best by her lights to determine whe-
ther action A is likely to promote goal G, then from the point
of view of her conception of her situation, it is rational and
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responsible for her to perform action A in pursuit of goal G
just in case she believes that A is likely to promote G.
If we apply this general principle to the epistemic case we obtain the
following:
ER2 If a subject has done her best by her lights to determine the
truth value of a proposition p, then from the point of view of
her conception of her epistemic situation, it is epistemically
rational and responsible to believe that p just in case she
believes that p is likely to be true.
And by virtue of our simplifying assumption, this is equivalent to the
following principle:
ER2* If a subject has done her best by her lights to determine the
truth value of a proposition p, then from the point of view
of her conception of her epistemic situation, it is epistemi-
cally rational and responsible to believe that p just in case
she believes that p.
I want to suggest that this revised principle provides a very accurate
constraint on the notion of the epistemic rationality and responsi-
bility of a belief from the subject’s point of view. According to it, if a
subject believes that p, then this belief could only be epistemically
irrational and irresponsible from the point of view of the subject’s
conception of her situation if she has failed to do her best by her
lights to determine the truth value of p.26
This gives us a very precise picture of how BonJour would have to
proceed to substantiate his claim that from the point of view of
Norman’s conception of his epistemic situation his belief that the
President is in New York City is epistemically irrational and irre-
sponsible. He would have to argue that Norman hasn’t done his best
by his lights to determine whether the President is in New York City.
The most direct route to this conclusion would be to contend that,
since Norman has gathered no evidence regarding the President’s
whereabouts beyond the testimony of his clairvoyant powers, he
cannot have done his best by his lights to determine whether he is in
New York City, and hence his epistemic rationality and responsibility
won’t be guaranteed by EC2*. However, this argumentative strategy
faces serious obstacles. The problem is that whether you have done
your best to attain a certain goal will depend, not only on what you
have done, but also on what you could have done. Doing your best
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can only require doing things that you are in a position to do. In
particular, doing your best to determine the truth value of a propo-
sition can only require obtaining evidence of a certain standard if this
is something you are in a position to achieve. Hence, depending on
the circumstances, a subject might have done her best to determine
the truth value of a proposition she believes even if her evidence for it
is not superior to Norman’s evidence for the proposition that the
President is in New York City.
Let me illustrate this point with an example. Clara, after wan-
dering for a couple of hours in the Marrakech souk, decides to return
to her hotel. She can’t reconstruct the route that has taken her to her
current location, and she can’t identify any visual clues, but she is
ﬁrmly convinced that the hotel lies to the right of where she is
standing. Now, the situation might be such that Clara is capable of
gathering evidence that would support or undermine the verdict of
her sense of direction. She might have a map or a GPS, or there might
be locals in the vicinity that could give her directions. In this case, if
she neglects to use these sources of evidence, she can be accused of
failing to do her best to determine the truth value of the proposition
that the hotel lies to her left. But Clara could also ﬁnd herself in a
situation in which none of these procedures is available to her. She
might have no map or GPS, and there might be no one around who
might give her directions, etc. In these circumstances, it would be
wrong to accuse her of failing to do her best to determine the truth
value of the proposition that the hotel lies to her left, even if her sense
of direction is all she can adduce in its support. Furthermore, when
the question is whether she has done her best by her lights, what
matters is not whether she has failed to use sources of evidence that
are as a matter of fact accessible and relevant, but whether she has
failed to use sources of evidence that she believes to be accessible and
relevant. In general, she could only be accused of failing to do her best
by her lights to determine the truth value of the proposition if she has
failed to consult a source of evidence of which she believes (a) that it is
available to her (monolingual Clara might feel incapable of obtaining
directions from the locals) and (b) that its verdict might make a dif-
ference to her views on the matter (distrustful Clara might trust the
locals so little that their directions are unlikely to aﬀect her conviction
that the hotel lies to her left). The accusation would be ungrounded if
there are no sources of evidence satisfying these conditions that she
has failed to consult.27
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We can now apply these points to Norman’s case. We have seen
that BonJour needs to argue that Norman hasn’t done his best by his
lights to determine the truth value of the proposition that the Presi-
dent is in New York City. To support this conclusion BonJour would
need to contend that there is a source of evidence satisfying the
conditions of accessibility and relevance that Norman has failed to
apply to the proposition that the President is in New York City. But I
can’t see that there is any legitimate reason to conclude that this is the
situation in which Norman ﬁnds himself. Nothing in BonJour’s
description of the case rules out the possibility that, of every potential
evidence source that Norman is aware of but has failed to apply to
the proposition in question, he believes either that he can’t apply it
(e.g., tapping the President’s phone might make him change his mind,
but he can’t really do it) or that it wouldn’t make a diﬀerence to his
verdict (e.g., he could ask his son, but what does he know…). And if
this is the situation, it follows from ER2* that Norman’s belief is
epistemically rational and responsible from the point of view of his
conception of his situation.
A speciﬁc version of the line of reasoning we have just considered
deserves special attention. There is a strong body of widely available
scientiﬁc evidence against the existence of clairvoyance. Since
Norman doesn’t have evidence against the possibility of clairvoyance,
he has failed to consider the verdict of science. But this means that
Norman hasn’t done his best to determine the truth value of his
belief, and hence ER2* doesn’t entail that his belief is epistemically
rational and responsible.
I suspect that this line of reasoning is responsible for much of
the intuitive appeal of BonJour’s verdict. However, it should be
clear that it rests on an illegitimate assumption. By failing to
consider the scientiﬁc evidence, Norman would only have failed to
do his best by his lights if he believed about this procedure that he
could apply it in this case and that the result of so doing might
make a diﬀerence to his ultimate verdict. But it is not part of the
case that Norman has either of these beliefs. The details of the case
could be ﬁlled in in such a way that Norman believes that he has
no access to the relevant scientiﬁc evidence. And even if he believes
that he could consider the scientiﬁc evidence if he wanted, he might
think that his belief that he has clairvoyant powers is so strong (or
that his belief in science is so weak) that whatever the scientists
might say would not make a diﬀerence to his conviction. And if his
belief is not the result of culpable self-deceit or negligence, in failing
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to take scientiﬁc evidence into account he wouldn’t be failing to do
his best by his lights.
To be sure, someone who holds science in such low esteem might
be open to criticism, and we might even want to accuse them of
irrationality or irresponsibility. But if their disdain of science results
from the honest and conscientious pursuit of the cognitive goal of
truth, the irrationality or irresponsibility they might be accused of is
not irrationality or irresponsibility from the point of view of their
conception of the situation. They might be irrational and irrespon-
sible from our point of view, or even from the objective point of view.
But from their own subjective perspective they are not doing anything
wrong. From their own point of view their rationality and respon-
sibility would not be open to question.
In his discussion of the ﬁrst version of Norman’s case, BonJour
suggests another line of reasoning which it is tempting to regard as
the real source of his conviction that Norman’s belief is episte-
mically irrational and irresponsible. The starting point of this train
of thought is what BonJour sees as the obvious irrationality of
Norman’s belief that he has clairvoyant powers:
But is it not obviously irrational, from an epistemic standpoint, for Norman to hold
such a belief when he has no reasons at all for thinking that it is true or even for
thinking that such a power is possible? (p. 42)
Thus BonJour declares Norman’s belief in his clairvoyance irrational
on the grounds that he has no evidence or reasons to support it. Notice
that the irrationality of Norman’s belief that the President is in New
York City cannot be established in quite the same way. In this version
of the case, Norman has evidence for his belief, since he takes it to be
sanctioned by a highly reliable procedure. The problem in this case is
that the evidence is not adequate. Norman has beliefs of which he
believes that their truth would make it likely that the President is in
New York City, but these beliefs lack warrant. As BonJour tells us,
‘‘this belief about his clairvoyance fails after all to have even an ex-
ternalist justiﬁcation’’ (ibid.). Thus this line of thought would derive
the irrationality of Norman’s belief that the President is in New York
City from his lack of adequate evidence for it.28
I want to argue that this line of reasoning is unlikely to provide a
signiﬁcant contribution to BonJour’s argumentative strategy. The
problem is that it rests on the assumption that epistemic rationality
requires adequate evidence. We can formulate the principle that is
being invoked in the following terms:
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Evidential constraint on epistemic rationality and responsibility: If
a subject doesn’t have adequate evidence for a proposition p that
she believes, then from the point of view of her conception of her
situation she is epistemically irrational and irresponsible in
believing that p.
I don’t want to discuss the intrinsic merits of this principle. I only
want to remind the reader that BonJour’s goal is to defend the evi-
dential constraint on warrant against externalist accounts of the
notion, which seek to solve the epistemic regress problem by rejecting
the constraint. And it is hard to see what argumentative strength
would accrue to an argument for the evidential constraint on warrant
that uses as a premise the evidential constraint on epistemic ratio-
nality and responsibility. This line of reasoning would be eﬀective just
in case those who are inclined to reject the evidential constraint on
warrant could be expected to be more reluctant to reject the evi-
dential constraint on epistemic rationality and responsibility. But I
see no reason to expect this. In fact, the rejection of the evidential
constraint on epistemic rationality and responsibility can be sup-
ported independently of the fate of the evidential constraint on
warrant – by the adoption of an account of epistemic rationality and
responsibility along the lines of ER2.29
I have focused so far on the ﬁrst version of Norman’s case.
However, my conclusions apply equally to the second version, in
which Norman ﬁnds himself strongly inclined to believe that the
President is in New York City, but has nothing to say in support of
his belief, since, unlike in the ﬁrst version, Norman doesn’t believe
that he has the power of clairvoyance. However, as we have seen,
according to ER2*, a belief can in principle be rational and respon-
sible from the point of view of the subject’s conception of her situ-
ation even if she has no evidence for it. This will be so if the subject
has done her best by her lights to determine the truth value of the
proposition in question. And we cannot rule out the possibility that
Norman, in the second version of the case, as well as in the ﬁrst, has
applied to the proposition that the President is in New York City
every source of evidence of which he believes that he could apply it
and that doing so might make a diﬀerence.
It seems to me that BonJour’s case at this point trades on an
equivocation when he suggests that ‘‘from [Norman’s] standpoint,
there is apparently no way in which he could know the President’s
whereabouts’’, that ‘‘there is no way, as far as he knows, for him to
have obtained this information’’ and that Norman’s belief amounts
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to ‘‘believing things to which one has, to one’s knowledge, no reliable
means of epistemic access’’ (p. 42). On one reading of these passages,
they portray Norman as believing that he has no way of acquiring
information about the President’s whereabouts. If this is what
Norman believes, then it is hard to see how he could fail to believe
also that the chances of his belief being true are no better than ran-
dom, and, according to ER2, this would make his belief subjectively
irrational. But nothing in BonJour’s description of the situation
indicates that Norman believes that he has no way of obtaining
information about the President’s whereabouts. All that follows from
the description of the case is that Norman can’t identify a source of
information about this matter, and it is perfectly conceivable that
Norman believes that he has a source of information about these
matters even though he can’t identify it. And in these circumstances
Norman’s belief that the President is in New York City might not be
subjectively irrational.
So far in my discussion of epistemic rationality and responsibility I
have argued that BonJour is not entitled to claim that from the point
of view of Norman’s own conception of his situation he is episte-
mically irrational and irresponsible in believing that the President is
in New York City. But notice that it is open to BonJour to concede
this point while still maintaining that Norman’s case supports Pre-
mise 1. All that is required to establish Premise 1 is to show that it is
possible that reliabilism ascribes warrant to a subjectively irrational
belief, and although BonJour’s description of the Norman case is
compatible with a situation in which Norman would not be subjec-
tively irrational, it is also compatible with a situation in which he is
subjectively irrational. Suppose, for example, that he has failed to ask
his wife, who works in the White House travel oﬃce and has always
been willing to give Norman accurate details of the President’s travel
arrangements. Then the rationality of his belief would no longer be
guaranteed by ER2*. But since reliabilism would confer warrant on
Norman’s belief independently of how these details are ﬁlled in,
Norman’s case still supports Premise 1.
This is a perfectly legitimate move, and it will be eﬀective so long
as the reliabilist wants to maintain that the subjective irrationality of
Norman’s belief would leave its warrant intact. However, the move
would be ineﬀectual against a reliabilist who is prepared to give up
this thought, arguing that the circumstances that would undermine
the subjective rationality and responsibility of Norman’s belief would
also undermine its warrant. This line could be pursued from within
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Goldman’s version of reliabilism, since one could argue that the
circumstances that would render Norman’s belief subjectively irra-
tional would also bring it under the non-undermining provision.
Alternatively, the reliabilist could adopt a bolder strategy. She could
simply modify her account of warrant by treating epistemic ratio-
nality and responsibility, construed along the lines of ER2, as an
additional necessary condition for warrant. The resulting view would
still be recognisably reliabilist, and, more importantly for our pur-
poses, it would still sustain an externalist solution to the epistemic
regress problem, by licensing violations of the evidential constraint
on warrant. And, needless to say, this version of reliabilism would
make Premise 1 immediately false, provided that, as I am suggesting,
ER2 is correct.
8. PREMISE 2
Let’s now turn brieﬂy to Premise 2 of BonJour’s argument against
reliabilism. The ﬁrst point to notice is that the claim stands in need of
support. It is far from obvious that one cannot acquire knowledge
‘‘against one’s better judgment’’. Thus, e.g., Alvin Plantinga has ar-
gued that fulﬁlment of one’s epistemic duties is not necessary for
warrant.30 Plantinga illustrates his point by asking us to suppose that
he is convinced that forming the belief that he is seeing something red
will deprive him of any chance of epistemic excellence. He argues that
this conviction leads him to acquire an epistemic duty not to believe
that he is seeing something red. However, he has the standard dox-
astic inclinations and it is only by heroic eﬀort that he manages to
refrain himself from forming this belief in the presence of ﬁre engines,
etc. Then he describes the following situation:
On a given morning I go for a walk in London; I am appeared to redly several times
(postboxes, traﬃc signals, redcoats practising for a reenactment of the American
Revolution); each time I successfully resist the belief that I see something red, but only
at the cost of prodigious eﬀort. I become exhausted, and resentful. Finally I am
appeared to redly in a particularly insistent and out-and-out fashion by a large red
London bus. ‘‘Epistemic duty be hanged’’, I mutter, and relax blissfully into the belief
that I am now perceiving something red. […] in accepting [this belief] I would be going
contrary to epistemic duty; yet could it not constitute knowledge nonetheless?31
The case can easily be adapted to support the rejection of Premise 2.
In any case, I am not going to engage here in a general discussion of
Premise 2. I am going to concentrate instead on the argument that
BonJour adduces it its support. He presents the argument in his dis-
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cussion of a possible reliabilist rejoinder. Before presenting Norman’s
case (case 4) BonJour presents three other cases of reliable clairvoy-
ants. What distinguishes these cases from Norman’s is that these
subjects have reasons for thinking either that the President is not in
New York City (case 1), or that they don’t have clairvoyant powers
(case 2), or that clairvoyance is impossible (case 3). The reliabilist
strategy that BonJour is discussing consists in accepting that the
subjects in the ﬁrst three cases lack warrant, while refusing to extend
this verdict to Norman. Here is BonJour’s objection to this position:
But how can case 4 be successfully prised apart from the earlier ones? What the
externalist needs at this point is a diﬀerent account of why the beliefs in cases 1–3 are
not justiﬁed, an account which does not invoke the notion of subjective irrationality,
and hence does not extend readily to case 4. (p. 46)
In this passage, BonJour is taking for granted the subjective irra-
tionality of Norman’s belief, and arguing against the view that it
might nevertheless have warrant. In other words, he is arguing for
the claim expressed in Premise 2 that subjective irrationality is
incompatible with warrant. BonJour argues for this conclusion on
the grounds that subjective irrationality is the best explanation of
why the subjects in cases 1–3 lack knowledge, and this explanation
would not be available if subjective irrationality were compatible
with warrant. BonJour devotes most of his eﬀorts to arguing against
Goldman’s alternative explanation of the absence of warrant in cases
1–3, apparently thinking that the optimality of his preferred expla-
nation could only be undermined by the existence of a better can-
didate. Here I want to pose a more basic objection to BonJour’s
claim. The hypothesis that the subjects in cases 1–3 are subjectively
irrational wouldn’t even be in the running for the post of the best
explanation of their lack of warrant unless it actually explained this
phenomenon. And it wouldn’t explain this phenomenon unless it was
true. Hence BonJour’s argument for Premise 2 would collapse if we
could reject the claim that the subjects in cases 1–3 are subjectively
irrational. This is precisely what I propose to do. I am going to argue
that nothing in BonJour’s description of his ﬁrst three cases indicates
that their subjects are subjectively irrational.
My reasons for making this claim are strictly parallel to the rea-
sons I adduced for the Norman case. Let’s concentrate on case 1.
What makes Samantha’s belief subjectively irrational, on BonJour’s
account, is the fact that she maintains it
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appealing to her alleged clairvoyant power, even though she is aware of apparently
cogent evidence, consisting of news reports, press releases, allegedly live television
pictures, and so on, indicating that the president is at that time in Washington, D C.
(p. 38)
Let’s consider what can be said about the epistemic rationality and
responsibility of Samantha’s belief from the point of view of ER2*.
The most direct route to the conclusion that according to ER2*
Samantha is epistemically irrational and irresponsible would involve
arguing that she hasn’t done her best by her lights to determine
whether the President is in New York City. Then the epistemic
rationality and responsibility of her belief would no longer be pro-
tected by ER2*. But on the basis of what we know about Samantha,
this would require arguing that she has failed to consider the bearing
of the ‘‘media’’ evidence on her belief that the President is in New
York City, and that she believes that implementing this procedure
might make a diﬀerence to her ﬁnal verdict on the truth value of this
proposition. It is not clear whether this second point is part of
BonJour’s description of the case – that would depend on whether
the evidence appears cogent to Samantha. If, having done her best by
her lights to determine the reliability of media evidence, she believes
that it is not to be trusted, then by failing to take it into account she
wouldn’t be failing to do her best by her lights to determine whether
the President is in New York City – even if the media evidence
appears cogent to us, or if it appears cogent in some objective sense.
But even if this point is conceded it doesn’t follow that Samantha
hasn’t done her best by her lights, since we are not entitled to assume
that she hasn’t considered the bearing of the media evidence on her
belief that the President is in New York City. The only reason to
assume this would be the thought that since the evidence appears
cogent to her, if she had considered it she would have concluded that
the President is unlikely to be in New York City, and hence, by our
simplifying assumption, she wouldn’t have the belief which by
hypothesis she does have. But this reasoning rests on a mistake. From
the assumption that the media evidence appears cogent to Samantha
it doesn’t follow that considering it will ineluctably lead her to believe
that it is unlikely that the President is in New York City.32 Cogency is
a relative matter. After considering the media evidence and realizing
that it indicates that the President is unlikely to be in New York City,
Samantha would have to weigh it against what she sees as her
clairvoyance evidence for the opposite conclusion. We can’t rule out
the possibility that Samantha’s belief that the President is in New
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York City emerges victorious from this contest, even if she conducts
it honestly and conscientiously and with no goal other than
truth. This possibility is not ruled out by BonJour’s description of
Samantha’s case, and if this is the situation in which she ﬁnds herself,
then according to ER2* her belief that the President is in New York
City will be epistemically rational and responsible, from the point of
view of her conception of the situation.
We have to conclude that BonJour’s description of case 1 is
compatible with situations in which Samantha’s belief is epistemi-
cally rational and responsible, as well as with situations in which it
isn’t. However, there is no reason to doubt that BonJour would
want to say in both situations that Samantha’s belief lacks warrant.
Hence, assuming that we require an explanation of the phenomenon
that works in both situations, subjective irrationality is not the
explanans we are looking for. Subjective irrationality can’t explain
why Samantha’s belief lacks warrant because she might not be
subjectively irrational in holding her unwarranted belief.
We can make the same point with respect to cases 2 and 3. The
outcome is that the absence of warrant in cases 1–3 couldn’t be ex-
plained in terms of subjective irrationality, even if warrant were
incompatible with subjective irrationality (i.e., even if Premise 2 were
true). This result undermines completely BonJour’s defence of Pre-
mise 2. He argues that it is entailed by what he takes to be the best
explanation of the absence of warrant in cases 1–3. But what he takes
to be the best explanation of this phenomenon is no explanation at
all, since its explanans is not even true in all instances of the phe-
nomenon. Hence BonJour’s argument for Premise 2 boils down to the
claim that it is entailed by an explanation which doesn’t work.
9. TWO FURTHER ARGUMENTS
I’d like to round up my discussion of BonJour’s attack on reliabilism
by considering two more aspects of his reasoning. The ﬁrst one con-
cerns BonJour’s attempt to bolster his anti-externalist case with an
analogy with ethics. In ethics we ﬁnd the same contrast between
objective and subjective perspectives for the assessment of action that
BonJour exploits in the assessment of belief. BonJour starts by con-
sidering an externalist account of moral assessment, according to
which the moral justiﬁcation of an action is determined by its actual
consequences, independently of the subject’s beliefs. As BonJour
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points out, saying that an agent’s action is morally justiﬁed in this
external sense ‘‘is not at all inconsistent with saying that his action was
morally unjustiﬁed and reprehensible in light of his subjective con-
ception of the likely consequences’’ (p. 44).
Then BonJour suggests that the moral externalist might try to
accommodate this subjective sense of justiﬁcation by adding to her
account of when an action is morally justiﬁed ‘‘the further condition
that the agent not believe or intend that it will lead to undesirable
consequences’’ (ibid.). But BonJour ﬁnds this proposal unsatisfactory:
Since it is also, of course, not required by moral externalism that he believe that the
action will lead to the best consequences, the case we are now considering is one in
which the agent acts in a way that will in fact produce the best overall consequences,
but has himself no belief at all about the likely consequences of his action. But while
such an agent is no doubt preferable to one who acts in the belief that his action will
lead to undesirable consequences, surely he is not morally justiﬁed in what he does.
(pp. 44–45)
For BonJour, the analogy with the epistemological case is perfectly
clear:
And similarly, the fact that a given sort of belief is objectively reliable, and hence that
accepting it is in fact conducive to arriving at the truth, need not prevent our judging
that the epistemic agent who accepts it without any inkling that this is the case
violates his epistemic duty and is epistemically irresponsible and unjustiﬁed in doing
so. (p. 45)
I want to make two points about this. First of all, notice that the
problem in the moral case only arises on the assumption that on an
externalist account of moral justiﬁcation it cannot be required that
the agent ‘‘believe that the action will lead to the best consequences’’.
BonJour doesn’t see the need to support this assumption, but pre-
sumably he thinks that an account of moral justiﬁcation that ac-
cepted this requirement would no longer qualify as externalist. There
is little point in quibbling about what makes an account qualify as
externalist. However, the analogue of this position in epistemology is
explicitly classiﬁed by BonJour as externalist. It is the position that he
attributes to Dretske. It requires, BonJour tells us, ‘‘that the would-be
knower also believe that the externalist condition is satisﬁed’’
(p. 233). Notice that, since it is not required that this belief has
warrant, this position would still sustain a solution to the epistemic
regress problem. I think there is little doubt that this position has
nothing to fear from BonJour’s ethical analogy.
BONJOUR, EXTERNALISM AND THE REGRESS PROBLEM 161
The second point I want to make questions more generally the
plausibility of the analogy. The problem that it raises for externalism
in epistemology is that the externalist is committed to ascribing
warrant to beliefs which the subject accepts ‘‘without an inkling’’ that
they are ‘‘conducive to arriving at the truth’’. Presumably this notion
is to be construed in analogy with the situation in ethics of an agent
who ‘‘has himself no belief at all about the likely consequences of his
action’’. In other words, the externalist is committed to ascribing
warrant to beliefs that the subject is not inclined to regard as true. I
want to suggest that the type of situation that this objection postu-
lates simply doesn’t arise. Believing a proposition is inextricably
linked with the inclination to regard it as true. The externalist is not
in danger of ascribing warrant to beliefs which aren’t accompanied by
this kind of inclination simply because there are no such beliefs.
Let me now turn to what is probably the key thought underlying
BonJour’s advocacy of the evidential constraint and his consequent
rejection of externalism. Its starting point is a principle connecting
epistemic justiﬁcation and truth:
The distinguishing characteristic of epistemic justiﬁcation is […] its essential or
internal relation to the cognitive goal of truth. It follows that one’s cognitive
endeavors are epistemically justiﬁed only if and to the extent that they are aimed at
this goal. (p. 8)
Notice that this principle by itself doesn’t lend any support to the
evidential constraint. In fact, it wouldn’t be surprising if a reliabilist
invoked it in support of her account of justiﬁcation, claiming that
aiming at the cognitive goal of truth requires using cognitive pro-
cesses that are suﬃciently likely to bring it about.
Of course one could object to this objectivist reading of ‘‘aiming at
truth’’, on the grounds that it leaves the subject’s conception out of
the picture, and hence is not suitable for assessing the rationality and
responsibility of her cognitive endeavours. A natural way of trying to
bring that perspective into the picture would be to switch to a con-
strual of aiming at truth in terms of the subject’s beliefs and more
basic inclinations concerning the extent to which her beliefs and
cognitive processes bring her close to this goal. On this subjectivist
construal, a subject would be aiming at truth so long as she didn’t
hold beliefs ‘‘against her better judgment’’, i.e., so long as she had
done her best by her lights to determine the truth value of the
propositions she believes. However, on this reading of ‘‘aiming at
truth’’ BonJour’s principle would still not lend support to the
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evidential constraint. A reliabilist could accommodate the principle,
on the subjective reading of aiming at truth, by adopting the proposal
I made at the end of Section 7 to treat epistemic rationality and
responsibility, construed along the lines of ER2*, as an additional
necessary condition for warrant.
Thus neither on the objective nor the subjective reading of ‘‘aiming
at truth’’ does BonJour’s principle lend support to the evidential
constraint. To use the principle in this way requires the speciﬁc reading
of the notion that BonJour puts forward in the continuation of the
passage quoted above, where he informs us that aiming at the cogni-
tive goal of truth ‘‘means very roughly that one accepts all and only
those beliefs which one has good reason to think are true’’. Needless to
say, on this reading of ‘‘aiming at truth’’, BonJour’s principle would
support the evidential constraint. The problem for BonJour is that his
reading stands itself in need of support, and I suspect that it is at least
as vulnerable as the evidential constraint itself. For it is hard to see
how someone who is inclined to reject the evidential constraint on
warrant can be expected to be more open to being persuaded to accept
an evidential constraint on aiming at truth. The evidential constraint
on warrant can receive no eﬀective support from this reading of aiming
at truth, or a fortiori from BonJour’s principle.
10. IRRELEVANCE
When a hypothesis is put forward as a solution to a problem,
the proposal can in principle be resisted on two diﬀerent fronts. On
the one hand, one could argue that the problem can’t be solved by the
hypothesis because the hypothesis is false. On the other hand, one
could argue that even if the hypothesis were true it would fail to solve
the problem. The attempt to solve the epistemic regress problem with
an externalist account of warrant is open to both kinds of attack. On
the one hand, one could argue that externalism can’t solve the
problem because externalism is false – because it is wrong to construe
warrant along externalist lines. On the other hand, one could argue
that even if an externalist account of warrant were correct, the epi-
stemic regress problem would remain unsolved – externalism would
be, in this sense, irrelevant to the epistemic regress problem. Let me
refer to this claim as the irrelevance thesis.33
As we have seen, BonJour’s attack on an externalist solution to the
epistemic regress problem seeks to undermine the proposal by
BONJOUR, EXTERNALISM AND THE REGRESS PROBLEM 163
arguing that externalism is false – that it would be wrong to construe
warrant along externalist lines. Notice, however, that BonJour ex-
plains his adoption of this line of attack as resulting from strategic
considerations. It is his reaction to a diﬃculty generated by how
radically externalism departs, in BonJour’s view, from ‘‘the Western
epistemological tradition’’ (p. 36):34
[…] this very radicalism has the eﬀect of insulating the externalist from any direct
refutation: any attempt at such a refutation is almost certain to appeal to premises
that a thoroughgoing externalist would not accept. (p. 37)
Strategic considerations aside, BonJour is convinced that the exter-
nalist solution to the epistemic regress problem should be rejected
not only on the grounds that externalist accounts of warrant are
false. Even if they were true they wouldn’t solve the problem. This is
the verdict that he attributes to Descartes and to ‘‘generations of
philosophers who followed’’ (Ibid.): ‘‘the suggestion embodied in
externalism would have been regarded as simply irrelevant to the
main epistemological issue’’ (Ibid.). BonJour’s support for this ver-
dict is unambiguous:
My own conviction is that this reaction is in fact correct, that externalism […] reﬂects
an inadequate appreciation of the problem at which it is aimed. (Ibid.)
It is hard to read this as anything but an endorsement of the irrele-
vance thesis.
However, I want to argue that BonJour would face a serious
diﬃculty in trying to combine the irrelevance thesis with other aspects
of his position. The diﬃculty arises from his support of a construal of
the epistemic regress problem along the lines of what I have called the
contemporary regress argument. The problem is simply that if exter-
nalism were correct, the problem generated by the contemporary
regress argument would be solved, as the argument for the impossi-
bility of knowledge would be deprived of a crucial premise.
BonJour might want to resist this outcome on the grounds that this
purported solution to the problem generated by the contemporary
regress argument involves ‘‘a repudiation of the very conception of
epistemic justiﬁcation or reasonableness as a requirement for knowl-
edge’’ (p. 35), and hence that, instead of solving the problem, this
position entails ‘‘that the regress problem in the form with which we
are concerned would simply not arise, so that there would be no need
for a solution […]’’ (Ibid.). But BonJour doesn’t want to extend this
verdict to the versions of externalism that we have considered here.
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And in any case it is hard to see what importance could be attached to
the contrast between solving the problem and preventing it from
arising, so long as the position under consideration has the conse-
quence that the possibility of knowledge is no longer under threat.
The reason why BonJour can’t argue for the irrelevance thesis is
not the radicalism of the externalist proposal. The reason is rather
that if the problem of the epistemic regress is construed as BonJour
proposes, the irrelevance thesis is false. Perhaps the antecedent of this
conditional is redundant, and the irrelevance thesis is false under any
construal of the epistemic regress problem.35 Then the problem would
only aﬄict internalist accounts of warrant. But another possibility is
that there is a diﬀerent construal of the problem that renders the
irrelevance thesis true. On such a construal, the problem would not be
solved by the adoption of an externalist account of warrant. Whether
such a construal of the problem can be provided is, I submit, still an
open question – and one of the most important challenges for con-
temporary epistemology. BonJour might be right in thinking that
such a construal exists, but he is certainly wrong in thinking that his
own proposal ﬁts the bill.
NOTES
* I have presented some of this material at UCL, Trinity College Dublin and the
10th Italo-Spanish meeting of Analytic Philosophy, held in Pamplona. I am grateful
to these audiences.
1 See L. BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Page references in brackets
in the text are to this book. For BonJour’s defence of coherentism, see ch. 5–8. For
his attack on the doctrine of the given, see ch. 3.
2 See L. BonJour, ‘‘The Dialectic of Foundationalism and Coherentism’’.
3 Cf. Ibid., p. 117.
4 Cf. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, IX 88–89, Sextus Empiricus,
Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I 164. Aristotle appears to have been aware of the argument.
Cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Chapter 3.
5 BonJour’s discussion of the problem is restricted to empirical knowledge. Here we
shall raise the problem as aﬀecting knowledge in general.
6 BonJour formulates the problem in terms of the notion of justiﬁcation. Its meaning
is supposed to be given in independence of the connection with knowledge that I am
treating as the deﬁnition of warrant, since BonJour thinks that there is room for
positions according to which justiﬁcation is not necessary for knowledge (cf.
BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, p. 35). However, he is not very
explicit as to what’s built into the notion. In any case, BonJour accepts the accounts
of warrant with which we will be concerned as accounts of justiﬁcation. Hence
formulating the problem in terms of warrant won’t distort BonJour’s views for the
purposes of this discussion. On this topic see Section 10.
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7 Proponents of the inferential account would want to weaken the requirement that
the subject should have the belief connecting the target proposition with the evidence
for it, while preserving the idea that the connection would have to be cognitively
accessible to the subject in some way. The same point can be made concerning the
subject’s cognitive access to the propositions that play the role of evidence. These
modiﬁcations wouldn’t have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the problems we are concerned
with. Cf. Ibid., pp. 19–21 for BonJour’s discussion of this issue. Notice also that one
might want to demand some kind of positive epistemic status for the subject’s belief
in (or cognitive access to) this connection. However, the problem can be generated
without this additional requirement.
8 Inferential trees with inﬁnite branches can be considered defective even if one
accepts the possibility of having inﬁnitely many beliefs. The issue is more complex
than I’m making it sound, but I shall follow BonJour in leaving this possibility to one
side. For a discussion of this point see E. Sosa, ‘‘The Raft and the Pyramid:
Coherence Versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge’’, Section 6.
9 Notice that my claim is not that BonJour considers the argument sound, but that
he regards it as the right construal of the problem.
10 BonJour, ‘‘The Dialectic of Foundationalism and Coherentism’’, p. 132.
11 D. M. Armstrong, Belief, Truth and Knowledge, p. 166.
12 See A. I. Goldman, ‘‘What Is Justiﬁed Belief?’’, Epistemology and Cognition,
‘‘Strong and Weak Justiﬁcation’’. For the contrast between the kind of view advo-
cated by Armstrong and process reliabilism see F. F. Schmitt, ‘‘Justiﬁcation as
Reliable Indication or Reliable Process?’’
13 The ideas presented in this chapter were ﬁrst published in L. BonJour, ‘‘Externalist
Theories of Empirical Knowledge’’.
14 Cf. Also BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, p. 50.
15 Goldman has resisted this point. See below.
16 Cf. BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, pp. 41-42.
17 At least in his initial reaction to BonJour’s cases, Goldman seemed to concede the
strength of this intuition. See below.
18 Robert Fogelin has endorsed this diagnosis. Cf. R. J. Fogelin, Pyrrhonian
Reﬂections on Knowledge and Justiﬁcation, p. 45. Cf. Also J. Vogel, ‘‘Reliabilism
Leveled’’, pp. 608.
19 Cf. Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition, pp. 62-63. Notice that the non-
undermining provision doesn’t jeopardize the possibility of using reliabilism to
underwrite the externalist strategy for dealing with the epistemic regress argument,
since the resulting view still makes room for the possibility of warranted beliefs for
which the subject lacks adequate evidence.
20 Cf. Ibid., p. 112.
21 Cf. A. I. Goldman, ‘‘Epistemic Folkways and Scientiﬁc Epistemology’’.
22 See Ibid. for an alternative reliabilist diagnosis of clairvoyance intuitions.
23 Using the intuitive approach to adjudicate the contest between reliabilism and the
evidential constraint requires cases that neither party is likely to impugn as marred
by contamination. We would need to focus on beliefs formed with a cognitive device
exhibiting the following two features. On the one hand, its reliability should not be
ruled out by fundamental aspects of our world-view. On the other hand, we should
have no strong inclination to assume that the typical subject will have adequate
evidence for or against its reliability. I have argued that Norman’s case doesn’t ﬁt the
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bill, but adequate cases are not hard to ﬁnd. It seems to me that the intuitions that
these cases elicit strongly support the reliabilist case, but I shall not pursue this point
here.
24 BonJour considers this objection in BonJour, The Structure of Empirical
Knowledge, p. 46. For an early defence of this line of thought, see W. P. Alston,
‘‘What’s Wrong with Immediate Knowledge?’’ The argument has been attacked
by Richard Feldman (cf. R. Feldman, ‘‘Epistemic Obligations’’) and more re-
cently by Matthias Steup (cf. M. Steup, An Introduction to Contemporary Epis-
temology).
25 I am simplifying matters by thinking of the rationality and responsibility of an
action or belief as a yes-or-no question. It would probably be more adequate to
construe them as a matter of degree, but it should be clear how to adapt my for-
mulations to achieve this. Notice also that the simpliﬁcation introduces an implicit
reliance on a notional threshold for the likelihood that A will promote G.
26 This conception of epistemic rationality and responsibility is closely connected to
Richard Foley’s notion of egocentric rationality. Cf. R. Foley, Working without a
Net. The only important respect in which the two notions diﬀer from each other
concerns the role that Foley accords to reﬂection. Thus, according to ER2* the
beliefs of a subject who has done her best by her lights will be epistemically rational
and responsible. The beliefs of such a subject will also be egocentrically rational
provided that she trusts reﬂection – that she thinks that doing her best requires
engaging in reﬂection. However, if the subject mistrusts reﬂection, her beliefs might
be epistemically rational and responsible according to ER2* but not egocentrically
rational. On this point, cf. Foley, Working without a Net, p. 97 and A. Plantinga,
Warrant: The Current Debate, p. 133.
27 On an adequate construal of the notion of doing one’s best by one’s lights to
determine the truth value of p, one could fail to do so not only by failing to use a
source of evidence that is related in this way to the proposition that p, but also by
failing to use a source of evidence that is related in this way to the proposition that
there is a source of evidence that is related in this way to p… A simple induction
would take care of all levels of iteration.
28 The text actually suggests a diﬀerent line of reasoning, according to which what
follows from Norman’s lack of adequate evidence for his belief is not that it is
subjectively irrational, but that it lacks warrant. However, in the context of trying to
support the evidential constraint on warrant, this move would be utterly question
begging.
29 For the possibility of subscribing to the evidential constraint on warrant but not to
the parallel constraint on epistemic rationality and responsibility, cf. Susan Haack’s
position on epistemological justiﬁcation and moral justiﬁcation: ‘‘I do not think it is
always morally wrong to believe on inadequate evidence. […] however, I think it is
always epistemically wrong to believe on inadequate evidence – in the sense that
believing on inadequate evidence is always epistemologically unjustiﬁed belief’’.
S. Haack, ‘‘‘The Ethics of Belief’ Reconsidered’’, p. 138. Bruce Russell also makes
room for this possibility. He writes: ‘‘questions of epistemic blamelessness are sep-
arate from questions of the goodness of evidence’’. B. Russell, ‘‘Epistemic and Moral
Duty’’, p. 38.
30 Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate, p. 45.
31 Ibid.
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32 If this connection held, then one could argue for the irrationality of Samantha’s
belief without invoking the simplifying assumption. Then doing her best by her lights
would put her in the curious situation of believing that the President is in New York
City and believing that this belief is unlikely to be true, which, according to ER2,
would render her ﬁrst-order belief epistemically irrational.
33 Prominent proponents of the irrelevance thesis include Barry Stroud and William
Alston. cf. W. P. Alston, The Reliability of Sense Perception, B. Stroud, ‘‘Under-
standing Human Knowledge in General’’. See E. Sosa, ‘‘Philosophical Scepticism
and Epistemic Circularity’’ for an attack on Stroud’s position, and R. Fumerton,
Metaepistemology and Skepticism for an attack on the compatibility of Alston’s
endorsement of the irrelevance thesis with his commitment to externalism.
34 For a diﬀerent conception of this tradition, cf. F. F. Schmitt, Knowledge and
Belief.
35 Cf. M. Bergmann, ‘‘Externalism and Skepticism’’ for a recent defence of this
claim.
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